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Book Reviews
On Contemporary & Future War
Scales on War: The Future of America’s Military at Risk
By Maj. Gen. Bob Scales, USA (Ret.)
Reviewed by COL Tarn Warren, Chair, Department of Military Strategy,
Planning, and Operations, US Army War College

T

his work is about the infantry, in close combat, the unique burden it
has and will continue to bear for our nation, why we are neglecting it,
and the cost of this neglect. A compelling narrative packed with piercing
insights, Scales on War: The Future of America’s Military at Risk is a well-earned
tribute to the military personnel who shoulder the weight of victory or
defeat on the battlefield and a cogent and persistent argument that future
conflict will demand more than ever before in our history from small
combat units. Written principally for US policymakers but immensely
useful for the wider defense community, Scales on War reminds readers
those who do most of the dying overseas—the infantry—often also, and
ironically, suffer at home from resource neglect and thin advocacy. With
urgency, Major General (Ret.) Bob Scales implores national leaders not to
be lured by high-tech, clean, quick, and bloodless thinking about victory
that distorts the true character and nature of war. Although his book is
thinly sourced, he effectively uses his lifetime of combat, senior military
leader, and national security experience to make his case.
Galloping through the past 100 years of US military history, Scales
adeptly describes the cyclical buildup and breaking of the Army before
and after each major war or conflict. As a result of this cycle, the US Army,
and especially the infantry, suffered from what he calls “amateurism,”
at least until the beginning of the all-volunteer force in the early 1970s.
This amateurism has, in part, resulted in higher and needless casualties
on the battlefield by those most likely to face close combat and has, again
in part, accelerated the pursuit of quick and bloodless victory using hightech standoff weaponry. To be sure, Scales does not eschew technology
in warfare. On the contrary, he embraces the need to leverage technology
to ensure dominant small-unit lethality and to better protect the soldier.
He asserts, however, that current policymakers and the entrenched
defense industrial base continue to steer warfare to a place it will not
naturally go—to a clean, quick, strategic victory via technology.
Indeed, Scales spends a considerable amount of time describing
current and future threats as those nearly immune from US technological advantages and willing to trade space and lives for time. Using
the oft-cited “asymmetric” playbook, future threats do not have to win
but merely not lose, run out the clock, and wait for the inevitable US
domestic aversion to increased casualties, resulting in gradual withdrawal
from the effort. His point here is to leverage resources and technology
at the small-unit level to improve lethality, reduce friendly casualties,
and achieve victory where the enemy lives and exerts its political power.
Simultaneously, Scales sternly rebukes those that claim big-ticket
warships and fifth generation jet fighters will claim the inheritance of
future victory. To achieve future victory, he calls for an unprecedented
investment in human capital, especially in the infantry. The United States
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must carefully select, train, and educate these warriors to be more like
special operations forces, including using social science as an amplifier.
Deep and persistent cultural training and education will greatly improve
small-unit effectiveness in complex environments with an enemy sometimes hidden in plain sight.
Lamenting the fact that soldiers and marines are still using nearly
obsolete and unreliable small arms, among other paraphernalia, Scales
also calls for a diversion of resource investment towards systems that
improve small-unit lethality and survivability, such as new semiautomatic
rifles, better ammunition of a caliber with more impact, lighter and
more-effective body armor, soldier-view cameras, and handheld devices
that replace secure radios and track not only the soldier’s location but
also his vital signs. Along with the gear, the US Army must also raise
its training and retention standards, accepting only personnel mature
enough to handle warfare in complex environments.
Furthermore, leader judgment and small-unit resilience are critical.
At more senior officer levels, the US Army must identify and groom
future strategic thinkers early with rigorous professional military and
civilian education. Admittedly, the author recognizes the cost and
time required to achieve these standards. He does not offer any easy
solutions. Despite his pleas, the author concludes with an ominous
forecast: without these needed reforms at the small combat unit level,
the US Army will break again within three years.
Overall, Scales on War reminds us victory in modern war may be
tough and elusive, but it still resides where sovereignty and political
power actually live: on the ground, up close. Although the narrative
occasionally makes hard gear-shifts and is redundant in a few instances,
the book delivers persuasive arguments for US policymakers and senior
military leaders to consider. Interestingly, there is a hint of “fighting the
last war” in this book. What if the next enemy is a high-end peer willing
to fight symmetrically? In this case, while the book’s prescriptions may
still be sound, its critique of our current defense investment may lose
some punch. The author, nevertheless, makes a strong case for investing in the aspect of our military perhaps most likely to achieve lasting
military and political outcomes—lethal, resilient, mature, and survivable
small ground combat units.

Cyberspace in Peace and War
By Martin C. Libicki
Reviewed by Aaron F. Brantly, Assistant Professor, Cyber and International
Relations, United States Military Academy

C
Annapolis, MD: Naval
Institute Press, 2016
496 pages
$55.00

yberspace in Peace and War by Martin Libicki is arguably the most
ambitious and thorough individual analysis of cyberspace challenges
written to date. Libicki places his deliberate and robust analysis into a
readable yet exhaustive work. He advances dozens of arguments from
the basics of cyberconflict to deterrence, coercion, and strategic and
asymmetric conflict—and nearly everything in between. The true value
of this volume resides both within its immense breadth, which exposes
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readers to the nuances of debates that have been forming within the
cyberconflict studies community, and within its depth on each topic.
The book should gain immediate prominence within the cyberconflict
literature canon and should be included in required readings of serious
graduate-level courses on cyberspace conflict.
What separates Libicki’s analysis from the field at large is his
willingness to understand deeply the technical, tactical, operational,
and strategic implications of a range of decisions. He is not a Pollyanna
for cyberspace, making prognostications about the impending doom
or the lack thereof in cyberspace, rather he charts a reasoned middle
ground that will challenge both pessimists and optimists. His central
argument resides in the realization that cyberspace is a complex domain
that engages a variety of core attributes across civilian and military government as well as the public, social, and economic sectors. Any attempt
to set policy or strategy in this domain requires coming to terms with
the domain’s nuance and complexity.
In coming to terms with nuance and complexity, Libicki builds on
his previous works on cyberdeterrence, cyberdefense, and cyberconflict
in cyberspace which provided more detail on individual topics but did
not encompass the full breadth necessary to understand the relationship between the different aspects of peace and conflict in cyberspace.
Cyberspace in Peace and War remedies the lack of breadth by walking readers
through nearly every debate in the field. The downside of this treatment
is some of the latter chapters, in particular, lose the depth necessary to
fully develop complex arguments. In the scope of a work connecting such
a robust variety of concepts, this lack of depth is not a major weakness,
but rather the starting point for academic and policy arguments.
Any chapter could constitute a stand-alone book, yet by consolidating arguments and linking chapters together Libicki provides a nearly
linear path for readers to follow. The section on the foundations of
cyberspace should be required reading for all senior leaders entering the
field. The chapters in this section provide a concise, easily understood
foundation for nontechnical individuals. Subsequent sections on
policies, operations, strategies, and norms provide ample evidence for
arguments on topics such as: how deterrence does or rather does not
work, how coercion in cyberspace is lacking, and why a nuclear analogy
to cyberspace is inaccurate. Senior leaders who read the entire book
will understand very well how one of the most-respected scholars in
the field rightly or wrongly interprets the challenges addressed—not
come away from the arguments presented having a fixed position. Senior
leaders who read the book as a debate rather than a fait accompli will
be able to apply the arguments and robust sourcing to their work in the
operational and policy worlds.
The greatest benefit of Cyberspace in Peace and War is that it removes
the rose-colored glasses that cyberspace is the final domain of conflict,
one which will solve or create problems independent of other domains.
Rather conflict in cyberspace, just as conflict in any domain, is part of a
larger whole, a whole that if approached studiously can yield a range of
benefits. Libicki does not gloss over the challenges presented by conflict
in cyberspace, instead he addresses each challenge in a reasoned manner
that continues to place him—and his work—at the forefront of the field.
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The Conceit of Humanitarian Intervention
by Rajan Menon
Reviewed by Richard M. Meinhart, Professor of Defense and Joint Processes,
US Army War College

R
New York: Oxford
University Press, 2016
256 pages
$29.95

ajan Menon, who has published extensively on many related topics,
provides a realistic approach to the reasons nation-states become
involved in humanitarian interventions with military campaigns focused
on ending mass atrocities. Mass atrocities may be spurred by a variety
of reasons to include ethnic conflict or cleansing, wars of succession
or revolutions, and genocide or race hatred. Menon proposes that states
primarily become involved in these warlike humanitarian interventions if it
is in the state’s national interests. Others, using a more liberalist approach,
have articulated that many campaigns were focused on ensuring universal
human rights across the globe, which have expanded with the ending of
the Cold War and the need for a “Responsibility to Protect (R2P).” There
are real tensions between these two approaches with the author exploring
these tensions in multiple ways by clearly examining the “why” behind
many armed humanitarian interventions of the last four decades. The
book’s smooth introduction, followed by eight succinct chapters with
appropriate titles, and almost 50 pages of expansive source notes provide
well-supported insights.
The book’s first chapter, “The Animating Ideal,” examines
tensions between a realist and liberalist approach by exploring the
intellectual foundation of humanitarian intervention. Menon discusses
the boundaries of sympathy towards the oppressed and duty to help
others, as well as how universal human rights and an enlightenment
mind-set have gained traction. This mind-set has the potential to cloud
the judgment of interventionists, who may not consider challenges or
counterarguments to their approach. The second chapter, “Altruism’s
Limits,” focuses on challenges and limits to this approach by a reticent
public that does not want to spend their nation’s blood and treasure
in warlike humanitarian intervention operations. Menon provides
many examples of deaths related to a state’s inability to provide foreign
aid to address poverty in certain areas and, most importantly, to not
addressing or minimizing the response to mass atrocities in Rwanda,
Darfur, and Syria.
From this impressive examination of the tensions between these two
approaches, Menon grounds readers in a more academic perspective,
providing historical examples of issues impacting humanitarian intervention in the third chapter, “Sovereignty, Legitimacy, and Intervention,”
followed by “The Legal Debate,” which highlights states’ rights versus
human rights, unilateral intervention by states or regional organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the
challenges with aligning law and morality. He shows how states have
used these concepts to justify to the global community their reasons for
engaging in, or conversely, for blocking the involvement of other states
in interventions. Examples from both chapters support the author’s
insights and include Pakistan and Bengali, Vietnam and Cambodia,
Tanzania and Uganda, NATO and Kosovo, and the United States in
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Panama and Grenada. Menon concludes with the thought that “power
and interest, not law, will prove decisive” when states decide to become
involved in humanitarian interventions.
The approaches and tensions on when to intervene are covered in
the fifth chapter, “Human Rights and Intervention,” which begins with
historical examples from the 1800s. Menon seamlessly transitions to
the complicated journey of the United Nation’s (UN’s) R2P debate and
the 2005 World Summit to gain a global consensus on humanitarian
intervention. Comments from the leaders of many of the nations at
the summit illustrate the extent of global divisions as the original R2P
proposal was diluted to provide more vague UN guidance for engaging
in humanitarian interventions.
The sixth chapter, “The Primacy of Pragmatism,” clearly cements
the author’s realistic approach to humanitarian intervention. He states:
“When friendly states commit atrocities, the great powers are wont to
look away, offer political cover, or even provide materiel assistance.”
Examples he provides to support this pragmatic approach include: the
West’s support for three decades of the brutal Indonesian dictator Suharto
following his take over in a 1965 coup, the United States overlooking
Turkey’s war against the Kurds in the 1980s and 1990s, the United
States and European nations ignoring Bahrain’s oppression to quash a
2011 popular uprising with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Cooperation
Council states’ assistance, and the way different states have approached
the ongoing Syrian conflict. The lack of humanitarian considerations in
these and other examples was compared with the UN Resolution and
R2P-worthy actions in 2011 by NATO and Arab states; both parties
wanted to oust Gadhafi due to his internal Libyan violence.
The book’s seventh chapter, “War and Post War,” smoothly
provides a needed historical perspective to a leader’s overconfidence in
quickly achieving their objectives when becoming involved with wars
and humanitarian campaigns. Many humanitarian campaigns can create
even more dire conditions within a region, especially when a dictator is
removed. Examples include: the killing and turmoil associated with the
former Yugoslavia region and NATO’s Kosovo and Bosnia campaigns,
and NATO’s and the Arab nation’s risk aversion strategy in ousting
Gadhafi and the anarchy and international rivalries that spilled over in
neighboring states. The final chapter, “The International Community,”
examines the influence, or better said the lack of effective influence, of
global organizations. Starting with an international relations philosophy
for how the global community has become more connective, Menon
examines international organizations such as the UN High Commission
for Refugees, the International Criminal Court, the World Food
Program, and the International Court of Justice. He provides examples
of how these organizations desire to address humanitarian challenges,
but lack the power, resources, and needed support of key nations.
The author’s conclusion succinctly describes how his realistic
perspective differs from humanitarian interventionists anchored by
normative values, and why his approach is important. He provides
final reasons “that I speak of the conceit of human intervention.” The
Conceit of Humanitarian Intervention is well worth the read whether you
agree or disagree with the author’s perspective, for it provides multiple
perspectives from theory and practice on past and ongoing humanitarian
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interventions. Perhaps, for future complex and uncertain humanitarian
interventions, leaders may want to integrate relevant principles from
both realist and liberalist approaches when making decisions if, when,
and how to intervene.

War & Legality
Waging War: The Clash between Presidents
and Congress, 1776 to ISIS
By David J. Barron
Reviewed by John C. Binkley, Professor of History and Government, University
of Maryland University College

New York: Simon &
Schuster, 2016
576 pages
$30.00

O

n April 6, 2017, President Donald Trump authorized a cruise missile
attack on a Syrian airfield in response to the use of poison gas by
Bashar al-Assad’s regime. The administration based the legality of the
missile attack upon the president’s power as commander-in-chief. While
many in Congress welcomed the attack, there was considerable concern
over the lack of congressional approval for the action. As any student
of American civics understands, the Constitution contains numerous
points of contention as institutional checks and balances come into play.
While the Constitution clearly gives Congress the authority to declare
war, its management of military operations sets the power of Congress
against the authority of the president as the commander-in-chief. Two
fundamental questions are raised regarding actions such as Trump’s: can
Congress interfere in the military’s operational decisions once war has
been declared, and to what extent can the president order the military
into harm’s way absent a declaration of war? These are the questions
David Barron attempts to answer in Waging War.
The answers to these questions tend to fall into two contradictory
categories. For analysts who believe in the unitary executive, such as
a John Yoo, a law professor at the University of California, Berkeley
and author of Crisis and Command: A History of Executive Power from George
Washington to George W. Bush (2009), the power of the executive as the
commander-in-chief is effectively almost unlimited, checked only by
the budgetary and impeachment authorities of Congress. Even in the
absence of a congressional declaration of war, the commander-in-chief
has unfettered authority to use military force to sustain America’s
interests. Once Congress has declared war, it abdicates operational
authority to the president.
Barron, a federal judge on the US Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit, rejects the unitary executive vision of almost unchecked
presidential power. Instead, he argues presidents have been very
cognizant of the constitutional prerogatives of Congress and have tried
to gain congressional acquiescence to presidential actions. According
to Barron, this deference to the legislative branch originated during the
American Revolutionary War when George Washington followed the
lead of the Continental Congress on a number of issues. This deference,
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however, was based on the explicit grant of authority given Congress in
the Articles of Confederation to direct military operations. Barron goes
on to argue that even with the creation of the executive branch at the
constitutional convention in 1787, the founders still believed implicitly
that congressional power was to be dominant. While his analysis of the
founders’ intentions is well written, interesting, and argued effectively,
his conclusions are less sure-footed. For example, Barron does not discuss
the important debate over whether to substitute the more operational
term “make war” instead of the legislative authority to “declare war.”
The next 25 chapters are a series of historical studies on the use
of presidential military power and how commanders-in-chief exercised
this power in relation to Congress prior to the Global War on Terror.
In most cases, the issue was how the president was going to achieve his
desired goals in the face of congressional obstinacy, and in many cases,
statutory obstacles. As Barron succinctly describes, the “commandersin-chief have found themselves mired in statutory restrictions in every
phase of American war-making, from the Revolutionary War, to the
early wars with France and England, to the Civil War and its aftermath,
to the specter of total war culminating in World War II, to the Cold War
itself.” In each case, the president had to figure out how to circumvent
Congress or co-opt its acquiescence either explicitly or implicitly. Since
the last declaration of war in 1941, the solution for both branches of
government has been a series of legislative grants of authority to conduct
military operations short of a declaration of war. The Gulf of Tonkin
Resolution (1964) is one of the more famous of these grants of authority.
The final three chapters address post-9/11 events. Barron delves
into the conflict existing between the unitary executive supporters,
primarily located in the Office of the Vice President and the Department
of Justice Office of Legal Counsel, and Congress, which believed it had
certain power over post-9/11 military operations. The conflict between
the George W. Bush administration and Congress over enhanced
interrogation techniques was probably the most contentious.
In assessing the quality of Waging War, this reviewer noticed the
writing style. While Barron, a former assistant attorney general of the
Office of Legal Counsel in the Department of Justice, clearly knows his
way around legal opinions and briefs, his writing is clear and uncluttered
with legal jargon. In comparison, many books on this topic read as though
they have been “cut-and-pasted” from a legal brief. Instead, Barron tells
a series of well-written stories supporting his position regarding the
presidents’ deference to Congress. While this style is readable for the
nonattorney, some of the stories could have used more legal analysis.
This is particularly apparent in the discussions of the writing of the
Constitution and the crucial Supreme Court decisions relating to the
executive/congressional war powers. Also, Barron selected stories
supportive of his general proposition, while ignoring those that might
have undermined it. For instance, he simply refers to President Thomas
Jefferson’s use of the navy against the Barbary pirates in the First Barbary
War (1801–5) as “a deft handling of the use of force” even though this
decision is an early example of the use of unilateral executive power.
Notwithstanding these minor criticisms, Barron has written
an extremely readable and effectively argued counterbalance to the
viewpoint of unitary executive theorists. For anyone interested in
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the constitutional relationship between the president and Congress
regarding war powers, Waging War belongs on your bookshelf.

Court-Martial: How Military Justice Has Shaped
America from the Revolution to 9/11 and Beyond
By Chris Bray
Reviewed by C. Anthony Pfaff, Research Professor for Military Profession and
Ethic, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College

I
New York: W. W. Norton,
2016
416 pages
$28.95

n Court-Martial: How Military Justice Has Shaped America from the Revolution
to 9/11 and Beyond, historian Chris Bray chronicles the evolution not
just of the military justice system, but also of our sense of what counts
as military justice. Thoroughly researched, Bray writes in an entertaining,
narrative style that sheds a fascinating light on a process that shaped both
the US military and the society it serves.
Civil-military relations in the early United States were very different
than they are today. In those days, every “able-bodied white male
citizen,” was a militiaman. This broad imposition, though popular at
the time, embedded in the militia an irreconcilable character: it was
simultaneously a government organization run by a strict hierarchy and
a neighborhood association that relied on mutual consent and a sense
of community. So while today our civil-military concerns are driven by
fears that the military and society are too far apart, in those days the
concern was they were too close together. Bray relates numerous stories
where bar fights and business disputes between neighbors ended up in
court-martials when one party happened to outrank the other in the
militia. Similarly, many units simply evaporated because the commander
did not treat subordinates as neighbors and gain their consent before
giving orders.
This conflation of civil and military came to a head during the War
of 1812, when Andrew Jackson declared martial law in New Orleans,
bringing civilians and military alike under military rule. He conscripted
soldiers from the local population and banished those who refused to
serve. When several militiamen from Tennessee tried to go back home
after their enlistments had expired, Jackson had eight of them executed.
When a state senator objected to Jackson’s continued imposition of
martial law months after his victory over the British, Jackson had the
senator, and any who tried to support him, including his lawyer, thrown
in jail. While Jackson’s own officers acquitted the senator, it was incidents
like these, and Bray chronicles many, that drove the American public
to prefer a large standing army rather than constant, if inconsistent,
subjugation to military law.
Even after civil and military split, military courts continued to serve
as an agent of change on the larger American society. While the role
of the military in improving racial equality is well-known, what is less
known is the important role of the court in that process. For example,
during the Civil War, some African-Americans drafted by the Union
army were tried for mutiny for objecting to serve for less than equal pay.
A number were executed. But because they were tried in court, their
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claims of injustice were aired, which prompted the same commanders
who ordered the executions to lobby Washington to provide the necessary
funds to right what they too saw as a wrong.
If the Civil War made the military more sensitive to racial inequality,
it did not resolve it. While African-Americans struggled for equality
under the law in civil society, military courts handed them a few
victories. Jackie Robinson, the first African-American to play professional baseball, was also one of the few African-American officers
commissioned during World War II. While stationed in Texas in 1944,
he found himself on trial for disrespecting a superior officer and
disobeying orders. The source of the disrespect and disobedience was
Robinson’s refusal to sit in the back of an Army shuttle bus, which, in
accordance with Army regulations at the time, had no segregated spaces.
The prosecution, realizing Robinson’s cause was just, tried to make the
trial about his justifiably angry response to an abusive interrogation by
the camp’s provost. The plan backfired, and Robinson was acquitted.
While the military justice system moderated over time—only one
person was executed for desertion in World War II—it still delivered
wildly inconsistent outcomes, which Bray describes in great detail. These
inconsistencies got a public airing in the aftermath of World War II
and forced reform. While there had been attempts at reform during the
interwar years, those efforts failed because the Army leadership, including its chief lawyer, saw them as undermining command authority. By
1948, however, in the wake of this public accounting, congress enacted
the Elston Act, which established the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
This legislation enacted many of the reforms sought previously. Notably,
enlisted service members would serve on tribunals where the accused
was an enlisted soldier. Lawyers, furthermore, would participate in all
parts of the legal process, meaning soldiers would no longer be defended,
prosecuted, or judged by the officers who commanded them. Perhaps
most importantly, the Elston Act prohibited “unlawful command
influence,” which meant commanders could no longer tell courts they
expected a particular verdict.
Court-Martial: How Military Justice Has Shaped America from the Revolution
to 9/11 and Beyond makes fascinating reading for military lawyers and
historians—and anyone interested in American history. The book will
be especially useful to military leaders at all levels who will benefit from
this deep, nuanced description of how military justice has evolved in order
to better understand where it—and American society—is likely to go.
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Counterterrorism
Eyes, Ears & Daggers: Special Operations Forces
and the Central Intelligence Agency in America’s
Evolving Struggle against Terrorism
By Thomas H. Henriksen
Reviewed by Dr. Adrian Wolfberg, Chair of Defense Intelligence, School of
Strategic Landpower, US Army War College
Stanford, CA: Hoover
Institution Press, 2016
194 pages
$19.95

T

homas Henriksen has written a relatively short, easy-to-read, quasihistorical account of the evolutionary relationship between the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Special Operations Forces (SOF).
This book is targeted exclusively to the general public. To that audience,
this book will seem tantalizing and sexy, providing a glimpse into a dark
and mysterious topic.
The meaning of the title, Eyes, Ears & Daggers, is partially alluded
to in the book. The “eyes and ears” refers, in general, to the intelligence community, while “eyes” seem to have been synonymous with the
CIA. The metaphor of eyes for CIA is not meant to be a literal analogy
to imagery intelligence, even though part of the CIA’s roots included
ownership and control of such. The term “ears” is not explicitly referred
to in the book although the plethora of mentions about the National
Security Agency (NSA) and its signals intelligence capability are the
obvious metaphor. As Henriksen points out, however, the CIA has a
signal intelligence capability, but one dwarfed by NSA. Daggers refers
to the military instrument of power, in this case, the author usually
means the SOF.
Henriksen’s premise, which he reuses throughout the book, is that
the individuals who are soldiers sometimes become spies, and vice versa.
Using the analogy of the eighteenth-century American Revolutionary
War army officer Nathan Hale who became a spy—and was caught by
the British and executed—Henriksen attempts to trace the dynamic
interplay between those who do soldiering activities and those who
do spying activities. The CIA has done both, as has SOF, according
to Henriksen.
I have some serious concerns about the scholarly value of this book.
First, the book is a selected summary from secondary sources that are not
scholarly. The secondary sources include: books or articles authored by
individuals who were formerly employed by the various national security
organizations who revealed unauthorized disclosures, information from
leaked documents, and information supplied by anonymous sources;
and newspaper articles by syndicated authors. If primary research was
done, it was not clearly demonstrated.
Second, structured as a historical account from World War II
through 2015, the narrative within each historical era goes back and
forth in time, moving between different contexts, making it difficult
to follow Henriksen’s argumentation. From a scholarly perspective, the
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negative effect of this style of writing is the difficulty in identifying and
validating arguments of causality within this complex topic.
Third, the book has many factual errors, which leads one to wonder
how many additional errors exist beyond what I could glean. For example,
the claim is made the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) was created
in 1961 to support tactical military operations, when any reading of its
creation directive, Department of Defense Directive 5105.21, 01 August
1961, defines its responsibilities primarily at the theater and strategic
levels of war. In another example, Henriksen mentions that Michael
Flynn, a recent director of DIA, was a four-star general; he was a threestar general. Other errors were noticed as well.
Fourth, the book is highly editorialized emphasizing one view
without acknowledging other views, and without evidence. For example,
Henriksen mentions Clausewitz and refers to his famous dictum, “war is
a continuation of policy,” when we know that this particular dictum was
merely his antithesis, necessary to reach his synthesis, and that his real
contribution was what Clausewitz called, the remarkable trinity; that was
his famous dictum. Henriksen mentions recent personalities in the press
and only represents them in the most positive light, yet fails to let readers
know the vast extent of differing views also mentioned in the press. For
example, Flynn is mentioned as being an outstanding colonel when in
Afghanistan, yet Henriksen fails to mention the plethora of reporting
that, at that time, he was known for his arrogance and toxic leadership
style. In another example, terrorists were almost always referred to as
“Islamic terrorists” or “violent Islamists,” without acknowledging or
explaining the intentionality and logic of those in Washington, DC
to not invoke the name of Islam to name them. One time, however,
Henriksen did refer to such as “insurgent-based terrorism” (162).
Fifth, there were two areas Henriksen briefly raised but should
have spent more effort to help the general public understand aspects of
the relationship between the CIA and SOF. The first was the sense of
identity; what does it mean to the individual who serves as a CIA or SOF
officer, and then assume opposite roles? Henriksen briefly mentions the
2003 US Army War College Strategic Research Project (SRP) by an Army
legal officer, Colonel Kathryn Stone. He used Stone’s SRP to reinforce
the idea that CIA and SOF individuals can serve in both functions of
intelligence collection and analysis and military operations. But, Stone’s
SRP was fundamentally about the legal and identity issues that separate
these two actors, focusing on what would happen, for example, if either
were a prisoner, different expectations surrounding compliance with US
law, and concerns with command and control. Henriksen could have
pivoted the discussion to address these concrete issues. Second, the
recent use of drones in nonwar zones, such as Yemen and Pakistan, was
raised briefly to discuss the conflicts in authorities over drone use, but
the logic behind who should be using drones, CIA or SOF, and why,
were not sufficiently discussed.
Finally, the recommendations proposed lacked substantive discourse
about how they might be implemented, and most have already been
proposed by others.
For many reasons, which I have attempted to identify the most
important, Eyes, Ears & Daggers is not a scholarly manuscript, nor does
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it provide new information or analysis from what has already been
published, and, consequently, it does not provide value to senior members
within and scholars of the defense or intelligence communities.

Chasing Ghosts: The Policing of Terrorism
By John Mueller and Mark G. Stewart
Reviewed by Robert J. Bunker, Adjunct Research Professor, Strategic Studies
Institute, US Army War College

J

New York: Oxford
University Press, 2016
408 pages
$31.95

ohn Mueller and Mark G. Stewart have created a first-class work in
Chasing Ghosts: The Policing of Terrorism with a hard-to-beat pedigree
of highly regarded authors, teams of research assistants supporting the
authors, numerous talks and conferences used to sharpen the arguments
contained within the book, various elements of the book appearing in
leading publications, over 600 references cited within, and the Oxford
University Press seal of approval stamped upon it. The book—per
the publisher’s synopsis—thematically “approaches terrorist-fighting
national security measures and spending with a critical questioning
from which they have largely been immune . . . analyzes the enormous
cost of finding domestic terrorists relative to the threat posed . . .
and . . . questions whether the current amount of resources allocated to
find terrorists is necessary and appropriate.” Hence, the authors argue
that Islamist extremist terrorists threatening the United States are like
ghosts that, while existing, are far more uncommon (N=62, post-9/11
through 2015) than conventionally thought (refer to Appendix A, pages
267–74). As a result, their premise is that the post-9/11 national security
apparatus established to catch terrorists is overkill and not worth the costs
associated with maintaining the present size of the massive programs
enacted to implement it.
The book begins with introductory insights into earlier ghosthunting episodes in Western history—those focused on witch hunting
(and burning) from 1480 through 1680 in Europe and communist
hunting (and career destroying) during the 1950s through the 1970s
in the United States—and how we have entered a radical Islamist
terrorist-hunting era post-9/11. Two sections make up the next portion
of the book. “The Ghosts” is composed of four chapters on official
perceptions, public perceptions, terrorism and the United States, and the
foreign adversary and mastermind myth, and “The Chase” is composed
of five chapters on counterterrorism enterprise evaluation, the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the National Security Agency (NSA), the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and local and airport police.
The book ends with a conclusion detailing the consequences of the
present ghost chase and three appendices, the latter two which cover the
costs inflicted by terrorism (Appendix B) and marginal costs and benefits
of FBI counterterrorism expenditures (Appendix C). Derived from the
material laid out in the book and the robust cost-benefit analysis related
to it, including tables related to risk-reduction calculations, the authors
make a very convincing argument that some counterterrorism programs
are more efficient than others and that, overall, the domestic security
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apparatus put together post-9/11 is very much a “throwing money at
the problem” debacle.
Still, the major theoretical and analytical strength of the book
derived from its rationalistic methodology that utilizes a cost-benefit
approach to public policy decision-making also, counterintuitively,
represents its weakness. The methodology utilized is unable to account
for noneconomic costs and benefits hence it is, in a sense, haunted by
its own ghostly bête noire of the ethereal and unquantifiable quality
of national security itself. This point is made abundantly clear related
to the passages addressing 9/11 and Pearl Harbor in that “there was a
clear lapse in rational decision making—that is, a failure to consider
alternative policies—and that lapse was not necessarily predictable
beforehand” (75). Such alternative policies, like “shor[ing] up the
protection of US territory and to engage in a patient, far less costly Cold
War-like harassment of the much under-resourced and over-extended
Japanese empire” (75) in response to the Pearl Harbor attack, may make
theoretical sense but contextually from a national security perspective,
which follows a very different logic than simple cost-benefit analysis—
one that includes concepts of grand strategy, deterrence, and the need
for an immediate response to a crisis of governmental confidence in
the national psyche—ignore the political and military realities of
great power politics.
Sometimes a state, even a classical one such as Rome, will need to “go
Masada” on an opponent and make a political statement no matter the
high economic costs incurred by such a large-scale endeavor. While this
may fail the logic metric of simple economic costs and benefits, it affords
the state many international and domestic policy benefits. This is not to
say Chasing Ghosts is categorically wrong about the overreaction to 9/11—
it is not; it provides a valuable analytical assessment of US bureaucratic
and policy failures in this regard. Indeed, US counterterrorism policy
needs to find the reasonable middle ground between the present
inflamed passions and bureaucratic momentums which have us “chasing
ghosts” while at the same time recognizing that states and their citizens
cannot, and should not, operate like soulless automatons that simply
engage in probabilistic risk-based decision-making devoid of any
emotive or ideological considerations. While Mueller and Stewart—to
their credit—are cognizant of this dichotomy, they tend to downplay
some of the real-world policymaking considerations states engage in
for the sake of strengthening the rationalistic cost-benefit arguments
presented in the book.
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he US national security community is accustomed to seeing the
word “Taiwan” paired with the term “crisis.” Yet, in recent years,
the Taiwan Strait has been remarkably calm and largely absent from the
headlines. It has been replaced by media attention on other Asia-Pacific
flash points, notably the Korean peninsula, the East China Sea, and the
South China Sea. Syaru Shirley Lin’s book contains significant insights
enabling readers to understand why the Taiwan Strait has remained
largely crisis free for almost a decade.
Continued calm is not assured. Taiwan remains the most likely
location for a full-blown military conflict between the United States
and the People’s Republic of China, even if the degree of tension and
probability of a conflagration have both declined significantly. The main
reason for this decline is not that China has given up on its pursuit of
national unification with the island; on the contrary, Beijing remains
staunchly committed to political union with Taipei. As Taiwan’s China
Dilemma makes clear, political leaders in China have to date exercised
considerable patience and exhibited a good measure of pragmatism and
flexibility in pursuing this goal. This pragmatism and flexibility have
been matched by political leaders in Taiwan. The result—a remarkable
expansion of cross-strait economic relations, transportation links, and
people-to-people interactions. The island’s China dilemma refers to the
reality of Taiwan “relying economically on a partner it does not trust and
that poses an existential threat” (206).
Understanding cross-strait dynamics and focusing on Taiwan
requires an examination of multiple factors, and Lin’s book brings
these together effectively, showing how economic realities and political
aspirations interact. Merely focusing on the burgeoning economic ties
increasingly binding Taiwan to China leads to a simplistic conclusion:
eventual political union is inevitable. Meanwhile, simply focusing on
political trends in Taiwan, such as evolving identities, suggests a more
troubled and even turbulent future for the island’s relations with the
mainland. Lin examines four case studies of Taiwan’s trade policy toward
China and shows how “identity forms the basis for defining interests,”
leading the island to alternate between restriction and liberalization (12).
Taiwan’s China Dilemma underscores that while people on the island
increasingly identify as Taiwanese and less as Chinese, they also recognize their economic present and future are intertwined inescapably with
China. Psychologically, the islanders are very proud of the democratic
system they have created and the economic prosperity they have built
through ingenuity and hard work. For Washington, Taipei’s persistent
Beijing dilemma demands continued US vigilance.
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Vanguard of the Imam: Religion, Politics,
and Iran’s Revolutionary Guards
By Afshon Ostovar
Reviewed by W. Andrew Terrill, Professor Emeritus, US Army War College
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fshon Ostovar’s Vanguard of the Imam is a study of the political and
military role of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)
since it was established in early 1979 as a pillar of the country’s new
revolutionary regime. Ostovar describes the development of the IRGC
from its beginnings as a loose grouping of proregime militias until its
emergence as a major force in Iranian politics and security over time.
Ostovar notes IRGC units began as a collection of Islamic militias within
a postrevolutionary patchwork of anti-monarchist groups that also
included powerful armed leftist organizations. Aware of the leftist threat
to its authority, the Islamic government quickly appointed an IRGC
command headquarters that provided the militia units with official status
and began the effort to centralize the force. The IRGC’s official standing
also gave it the political cover it needed to engage in actions such as
disarming rival militias and detaining suspected counterrevolutionaries
before turning them over to the doubtful justice of revolutionary
courts. Throughout this period of upheaval, Ayatollah Khomeini, the
leader of the new government, stressed the danger of foreign powers
attempting to undo the revolution through a campaign of subversion and
other hostile acts. With Khomeini’s encouragement, the IRGC leaders
correspondingly justified the campaign against potential rivals as a fight
against US and Israeli “plots.”
A central turning point for the development of the IRGC was the
Iran-Iraq War, which began with Saddam Hussein’s September 1980
invasion of Iran. At the beginning of this struggle, IRGC fighters were
poorly armed, undisciplined, badly trained, poorly led, and had only a
few units with combat experience (against Kurdish guerrillas). The organization, nevertheless, did everything it could to rise to the occasion.
Early in the war, the IRGC leadership attempted to substitute the
revolutionary enthusiasm of its members for military expertise. In this
environment, IRGC military efforts yielded high Iranian casualties, but
over time members’ combat skills improved, and sometimes the force
inflicted serious setbacks on the usually less-motivated Iraqi ground
troops, especially in urban fighting. As the war continued, the IRGC
and its subordinate Basij militia (mostly made up of boys in their early
and mid teens) became the chief proponents of mass infantry assaults as
well as the primary participants in such operations (often described as
“human waves”). These tactics produced horrendous Iranian casualties,
but they also helped to break the Iraqi army’s defensive formations in
Iran and push the Iraqis back into their home territory. This approach
further leveraged Iran’s larger population as a way of countering Iraqi
technological superiority and greater access to weapons suppliers.
Flushed with these grisly victories, the IRGC gradually replaced
the regular army as Iran’s leading operational force in the conflict.
Moreover, so long as the Iranians continued to rely on human-wave
tactics, the IRGC/Basij forces could plausibly claim that they should
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be the dominant forces for achieving an Iranian victory. Unfortunately
for these organizations, they championed this tactic long after the
Iraqis had learned to cope with it through dramatic improvements in
their system of defenses. Iranian mass infantry attacks increasingly led
to horrendous losses for negligible gains. By 1988, Iran had suffered a
number of battlefield defeats and no longer had a viable path to winning
the war. Consequently, the regime had no other option except to agree
to a United Nations sponsored plan to end the war. The Iran-Iraq War
correspondingly ended in August 1988 without any clear Iranian gains.
The failure to defeat Iraq served as a significant blow to the prestige of
the IRGC with its previous unrelenting calls for more sacrifice as the
road to total victory.
Despite these setbacks, the IRGC sought new roles for itself in the
post-war era and in an especially significant move established the Qods
Force. This elite IRGC force took over the responsibility for exporting
Islamic revolution and thereby creating a regional order more open to
Iranian power and priorities. The IRGC correspondingly became the
main instrument of Iranian meddling throughout the region, replacing
the Office of Liberation Movements, and building on previous IRGC
involvement in countries such as Lebanon. Ties to Shia overseas clients
and militias were a priority, and these groups have often been especially
receptive to Iranian influence, although the IRGC has also supported
some Sunni groups that share its goals. In contemporary times, the
Qods Force has played an important role in supporting the Assad regime
in Syria and is a major supporter of the most prominent Shia militias
fighting ISIS in Iraq. Qods Force commander Qassem Soleimani has
claimed the uprising against the Assad regime in Syria is part of a much
larger Western plan to weaken “Iran’s place in the region” (207).
Also in contemporary times, the IRGC continues its intense
devotion to Iran’s supreme leader. The IRGC’s role and functions are
safeguarded through the dominance of the leader within Iran’s theocratic
system and his special relationship with the IRGC. The 2009 elections,
which are widely assumed to have been rigged by the government, serve
as an example of this relationship. As unrest expanded, angry mass
demonstrations against the vote rigging became a serious problem for
the regime, especially when demonstrators singled out Supreme Leader
Ali Khamenei, in chants of “death to the dictator” (185). The IRGC
correspondingly unleashed Basij militia forces (which may number over
four million) to crush the demonstrators and brutally restore order
for the regime.
Despite this and other chilling episodes, Ostovar concludes on what
seems like a bit of forced optimism suggesting that the IRGC may yet
find itself weakened by the longing of the Iranian population for reform
as evidenced by a number of elections where moderate candidates for
office did well despite systematic governmental efforts obstruct their
success. He also notes that a future supreme leader will almost certainly
enter the office weaker than Ayatollah Khamenei, and may need to
make concessions on reform to maintain some level of legitimacy for the
system. Such developments are certainly possible, but it is also possible
that the current system, which has become remarkably resilient, will
maintain itself in the same basic form for some time to come.

Book Reviews: Military History

133

Military History
High Command: British Military Leadership
in the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars
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Reviewed by Anthony C. King, Chair in War Studies, Department of Politics
and International Studies, University of Warwick
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he period 2003–9 remains a traumatic one for the British defense
establishment. The United Kingdom had committed to a deeply
unpopular and possibly illegal war in Iraq in 2003 and, then, already
embroiled in a failing and underresourced struggle in Basra, the country
launched itself into another major campaign in Helmand. Operating far
in excess of defense planning assumptions, the results were predictable.
The British forces, led by the army, suffered a humiliating defeat
in Basra, while they proved, despite their best efforts, incapable of
pacifying Helmand. The implications for the transatlantic relationship
were profound.
In High Command: British Military Leadership in the Iraq and Afghanistan
Wars, Christopher Elliott, a former two-star general in the British
Army, seeks to explain how the British armed forces and the defense
community could have failed so badly. There has been much criticism
of the senior commanders and politicians over the Iraq and Afghan
campaigns culminating in the Chilcot Inquiry into the Iraq War. Elliott,
however, notes an oversight: “what the witnesses at the Chilcot Inquiry
have not revealed is why good, principled, capable public servants took
the actions that they did” (1). He, therefore, determines to explain
this conundrum.
Understandably, Elliott wants to avoid the polemical and ad hominem
criticisms that have been levelled at senior commanders. Explaining the
Iraq-Afghan debacle would be easy if senior officers were just stupid,
weak, or malign. For him, the debacle over Basra and Helmand is
interesting precisely because senior officers were overwhelmingly so
honest, hard-working, and professional. In the last section of the book,
he discusses each Chief of the Defence of Staff who served from 1998 to
2010, concluding “it is self-evident that officers of high ability achieved
the top military post of UK Chief of the Defence Staff in his period.”
Similarly, “all the military chiefs who worked with the Secretaries of
State [for Defence] of the decade had nothing but admiration for them”
(44). Overseen by competent professionals, the British crisis was an
anomaly, then, which Elliott wants to unravel.
Elliott proposes two central explanations for the crisis. Firstly, while
individual officers at every level were highly capable, the armed forces
institutionalized a system of command that was unhelpful in this era. As
an imperial power, British forces have long been accustomed to devolving
authority to local commanders. The introduction of mission command
into British military doctrine from the 1980s has only accentuated this
tendency. Consequently, despite the existence of significant command
nodes in the United Kingdom, such as the Permanent Joint Headquarters
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(PJHQ) and the Ministry of Defence (MOD) Director of Operations,
senior commanders in London consistently referred to commanders on
the ground in Iraq and Helmand as “there emerged a culture where there
was just too much deference to the commander on the ground” (177).
Consequently, focused on the tactical issues of the local commander,
normally on a six-month tour, no coherent national strategy was ever
developed and “it was inevitable that each successive vision changed
substantially on handover, not least because of deference from PJHQ
and the MOD to the man on the ground.”
Excessive decentralization was partly a product of the second
central reason for the crisis—the politics of the Ministry of Defence and
Whitehall, more broadly. Elliott outlines how the different interests and
priorities of politicians, civil servants, and military officers sometimes
conflicted with each other to prevent coherent strategic decision-making.
In addition, the administrative procedures of Whitehall, a monstrous
bureaucracy, impeded coherent decision-making and responsibility.
In an opening vignette, Elliott describes the niceties of its
“Byzantine processes” with sharp irony. On his first day as director of
military operations in the MOD, Elliott was given a series of files on
which to make a decision. Finding the staff-work flawless, he confidently
signed off on each file without reference to his colleagues. The decisions
seemed so obvious no consultation was required. Elliott, however,
was soon confronted by his subordinate: “Brigadier, you signed off
the files . . . without socializing them?” (4). No matter how obvious a
decision, it was the norm in the Ministry of Defence to confer with the
Head of Secretariat, Finance, and probably the Foreign Office, too.
Against this viscosity, strategic commanders in London found it
easier to short-circuit decisions by simply passing them down to the local
commanders and then presenting the Ministry of Defence, Whitehall,
and, indeed, the government with a fait accompli. Yet, the consequences
of this ad hockery became obvious in Iraq “when the British found
themselves up to their necks in a problem very much greater than they
had first anticipated, they lacked the political and institutional will to
resolve it, either by reinforcing with sufficient combat forces to master
the insurgency or by deploying sufficient cross-government capabilities
to exploit military success where it appeared” (125). The episode was
truly tragic.
Written by an insider, High Command provides a very useful and
perceptive insight into the problems which vitiated British strategy in the
crucial decade after the September 11 attacks. There is but one irony in
the book. Elliott rightly highlights the problems of interservice rivalry in
the Ministry of Defence. As an army officer, however, he cannot always
resist a subtle dig at the Royal Marines. He notes the apparent anomaly of
sending the marines to landlocked Afghanistan in 2002. While the fact
that the Chief of the Defence Staff was an admiral was not irrelevant, the
United States requested the Royal Marines for their expertise in mountainous terrain—not for their amphibious capabilities. More archly,
Elliott records “several have commented in interview that the hugely
talented and influential [Royal Marines] Lieutenant General Sir Rob Fry
would have approached things differently as Director of Operations in
the MOD if he had experienced high field command himself, which
through no fault of his own, was denied to him” (179). While the British
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Army has two divisions and a corps, the largest formation of the Royal
Marines is, of course, a brigade. Tribalism lives on.

MacArthur’s Korean War Generals
By Stephen R. Taaffe
Reviewed by Donald W. Boose Jr., Contract Faculty Instructor, US Army War
College; author of US Army Forces in the Korean War 1950–53 (Osprey
Publishing, 2005); and coeditor of The Ashgate Research Companion to the
Korean War (Routledge, 2014)
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n this fascinating book, Stephen R. Taaffe examines the performance of
and relationships among senior US ground force commanders during
the first year of the Korean War when General Douglas MacArthur
served as the unified, multinational commander-in-chief, Far East
Command, and commander-in-chief, United Nations Command (UNC).
During MacArthur’s tenure, his forces first conducted a delay against
attacking North Korean forces, then began a counteroffensive with the
amphibious landing at Inchon and subsequent push deep into North
Korea. A massive Chinese intervention in the winter of 1950–51 forced
the UNC back into South Korea. A renewed UNC counteroffensive
and subsequent war of movement in 1951 culminated in a final drive
back to a line generally north of the 38th Parallel. At that point, the two
sides began negotiations that would, after another 18 months of bloody
but static conflict, bring an armistice that remains in effect to this day.
For each phase, Taaffe provides clear, tightly written descriptions of the
strategic situation, the military operations, and the actions of the senior
ground force leaders. He concludes each section with an analysis of the
performance of the senior leaders.
Taaffe, an experienced and respected military historian who has
published several excellent books on senior American military leaders
during the Revolution, the Civil War, and World War II, is well placed to
make these assessments. His evaluations are thoughtful, well informed,
and persuasive. He deals with the two most controversial Korean War
generals, MacArthur and X Corps Commander Edward M. Almond,
objectively and unemotionally. He argues some of the qualities that
had made MacArthur successful in the Pacific in World War II (giving
his subordinates free play, remaining aloof from tactical decisions, and
playing senior leaders against each other) were counterproductive in
Korea. He also faults MacArthur for his decision to separate Almond’s
X Corps from Lieutenant General Walton H. Walker’s Eighth Army, for
withdrawing X Corps to conduct an amphibious turning movement into
northeastern Korea, and for his hasty, ill-organized push north that left
UNC forces vulnerable to the Chinese attack. Almond, he concludes
“was certainly an overbearing, arbitrary, and insensitive man who made
mistakes, but his innate aggressiveness and single-minded determination
to win paid big dividends for the Eighth Army” (172).
Walker, MacArthur’s ground component commander, tried with
his understrength and poorly equipped Eighth Army to stop stronger,
better-prepared North Korean forces during the chaotic and desperate
first two months of the war. While noting examples of inadequate
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leadership by some of Walker’s subordinates, Taaffe praises Walker
for his conduct of the delay and subsequent tenacious defense of the
Pusan Perimeter. He also notes Walker did not have MacArthur’s full
confidence, refused to challenge some of MacArthur’s questionable
decisions, and failed to relieve weak subordinates from fear of being
relieved himself. Taaffe blames the substandard performance of some of
Walker’s subordinates in part on their selection, based not on previous
performance, but rather to give them experience at a regimental or
divisional command or as a reward prior to retirement.
Walker was killed in a traffic accident in December 1950. His
replacement, Lieutenant General Matthew B. Ridgway, had the full
confidence of both MacArthur and Army Chief of Staff J. Lawton
Collins, which greatly strengthened Ridgway’s position, allowing him
to replace most of the early-war division commanders and to take
other actions that improved capabilities. Ridgway’s Eighth Army, now
experienced in combat and under solid leadership at all levels, stopped
the Chinese winter offensive.
Taaffe continues his analysis beyond April 1951, when President
Truman relieved MacArthur of command and replaced him with
Ridgway. Ridgway in turn was replaced as Eighth Army commander
by Lieutenant General James A. Van Fleet, whom Taaffe rates highly.
Under Van Fleet, Eighth Army stopped another Chinese offensive and
drove north, well past the 38th Parallel. Taaffe argues, despite an uneven
performance earlier in the war, Eighth Army fought well enough to win
the war militarily. He insists Van Fleet most likely could have continued
the offensive further north, and he notes it was a political decision, not
the military situation, that stopped Eighth Army.
Readers may argue with some of Taaffe’s judgments, but he
has exhaustively examined the documentary evidence and makes a
compelling case. MacArthur’s Korean War Generals is particularly relevant
to readers of Parameters. What could be more valuable to senior military
professionals than a well-informed study of leadership and operational
art during a major and challenging war? This is the heart and soul of the
military profession, and Taaffe makes a substantial contribution to the
grand conversation on the art of war.

The Myth and Reality of German Warfare: Operational
Thinking from Moltke the Elder to Heusinger
By Gerhard P. Gross
Reviewed by Richard L. DiNardo, Professor of National Security Affairs, US
Marine Corps Command and Staff College
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C

ertainly no foreign military establishment has garnered more
attention in the United States than the German army. Historically,
the German army of World War II has taken the lion’s share of interest,
but consideration of the army of the Kaiserreich has grown with the
arrival of the centennial of the Great War. Some scholars, most notably
Robert M. Citino, have posited the idea of a “German way of war.”
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This volume by Gerhard Gross is a welcome addition to the corpus of
literature on this subject.
Gross, is both a colonel and a career officer in the German Bundeswehr
and a well-published author and researcher. Until recently, he had been
the head of the Department of German Military History before 1945
at the Center for Military History and Social Sciences of the Bundeswehr
(ZMSB) located in Potsdam, Germany. The center is the successor to
the former Military History Research Office (MGFA), the organization
that had produced the German “semiofficial” history of World War II,
translated into English under the title Germany and the Second World War.
Gross’s work is very similar to Citino’s German Way of War, but with
some important and interesting differences. Where they agree is on the
basic parameters of the Prusso-German approach to war. Given the
geographic circumstances of the Prussian kingdom, the Prussian army
and its German successor sought to fight short wars, quickly decided by
sharp offensively oriented campaigns culminating in decisive battles.
Thus, while Napoleon is often credited with creating this style of warfare,
for the great Prussian theorist Carl von Clausewitz, Napoleon was merely
the continuator of a process really begun by Frederick William, Elector
of Brandenburg.
While Citino began his work with Frederick, the Great Elector
of the seventeenth century, Gross begins his book with Helmuth von
Moltke, Moltke the Elder, and thus wades into a controversy that still
resonates today, especially in the American military. Moltke is credited
with creating the operational level of warfare—or at least identifying
it. Defining it, however, was another matter. As Gross notes, Moltke
contributed to the confusion with the looseness of his language in his
writing on the subject.
The greatest danger to the German army’s preferred method of
warfare was something over which the army had no control, namely
increasing size. The span of Moltke’s career saw the rise of mass armies,
first in the American Civil War and later in Europe after the creation of
the German Empire in 1871. The growth in the size of armies made the
prospect of waging a short, sharp conflict problematic. Although all the
European war plans that were developed called for decisive campaigns,
other factors almost ensured the plans would miscarry. Primary among
these factors was logistics. Gross notes the failure to take logistics
into account was one of the constant weaknesses of German military
planning throughout the period of both world wars.
Another critical factor for the German way of war was the
environment in which war was conducted. The German high command,
both during and after the war, pointed to the Battle of Tannenberg as
the ideal operation. Gross, however, identifies two important things that
run counter to this fixation. First, Tannenberg was a defensive battle, as
opposed to the German army’s preferred posture, which was offensive.
In addition, the battle was fought on German territory, allowing German
commanders Paul von Hindenburg and Erich Ludendorff to make use
of the excellent road and rail system.
The German method of waging war was thus best suited to areas of
central and western Europe, where road and rail systems could facilitate
the conduct of rapid operations. Where these systems were not present,
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most notably in the expanses of Russia, the German way of warfare
either yielded indecisive (if occasionally spectacular) results or broke
down completely.
Where German military thinking really failed was in its focus,
which was generally downward. Thus, the focus of thinking, education,
and doctrine produced an army that was operationally nimble and
tactically adept, but strategically as bereft of ideas as the country’s
political leadership.
Gross goes beyond the scope of most works on German military
history, including Citino’s, by extending his discussion into the early
Cold War period. The thinking of both German armies owed much
to its predecessor, although the Soviet army had also developed its
operational theory during the war. For the newly created Bundeswehr,
the key figure was Adolf Heusinger, a high-level staff officer who was
arrested by the Gestapo in 1944 as a suspect in the attempt to kill Adolf
Hitler. Ironically, the German approach to conventional warfare worked
best when incorporated into a broader alliance system, where a bigger
ally really determined the strategy.
In conclusion, Gross has made a major contribution to the literature
in this field. The Myth and Reality of German Warfare: Operational Thinking
from Moltke the Elder to Heusinger is indispensable reading for any student
of the topic.

